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Abstract 
We review empirical evidence on the ability of decentralization to enhance preference matching 
and technical efficiency in the provision of health and education in developing countries. Many 
influential surveys have found that the empirical evidence of decentralization’s effects on service 
delivery is weak, incomplete and often contradictory. Our own unweighted reading of the 
literature concurs.  But when we organize quantitative evidence first by substantive theme, and 
then – crucially – by empirical quality and the credibility of its identification strategy, clear 
patterns emerge. Higher quality evidence indicates that decentralization increases technical 
efficiency across a variety of public services, from student test scores to infant mortality rates. 
Decentralization also improves preference matching in education, and can do so in health under 
certain conditions, although there is less evidence for both. We discuss individual studies in 
some detail.  Weighting by quality is especially important when quantitative evidence informs 
policy-making. Firmer conclusions will require an increased focus on research design, and a 
deeper examination into the prerequisites and mechanisms of successful reforms. 
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1.  Introduction 
Decentralization is a broad policy movement across both the developing and developed 
worlds (Agnew 1990a, 1990b). In the late 1990s it was estimated that 80 percent of the 
world’s countries were experimenting with one form or another of decentralization 
(Manor 1999).  Since then, new or deepening reforms have been announced in nations as 
diverse as Bolivia, Cambodia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, South 
Korea, Turkey, and many others. By now it is safe to say that experiments with, and 
enthusiasm for, decentralization are essentially ubiquitous across the globe. 
Theories underpinning such enthusiasm are compelling and argue that by taking the 
government “closer to the people”, decentralization can improve the responsiveness and 
accountability of the state, decrease corruption, increase the political voice and 
participation of ordinary citizens, and also reduce bureaucracy and lower the unit costs of 
government expenditure (Faguet 2014; Faguet 2012). The slogan “closer to the people” 
can be decomposed into three underlying analytical advantages that local governments 
have over central government: (a) superior information on local conditions and needs, 
(b) greater participation of citizens in decision making and the production of local 
services, and (c) greater accountability of public officials to voters (Escobar-Lemmon 
2006; World Bank 2004). The local governments possessing such advantages preside 
over jurisdictions that are smaller and more homogeneous than those of national 
government. Local governments’ decision making will thus be facilitated by not having 
to cater to a more diverse set of needs and wants. With superior information, 
participation, accountability, and policy challenges that are less onerous, it follows 
logically that decentralization should improve public services. 
Yet the many surveys of the literature overwhelmingly agree that empirical evidence 
is inconclusive. In one of the earliest reviews, for instance, Rondinelli et al. (1983) note 
that decentralization seldom, if ever, lived up to its promise. Shah et al. (2004) concur in 
a review of 56 studies published since the late 1990s, chronicling that decentralization in 
some cases improved, and in others worsened, service delivery, corruption and growth 
across a large range of countries. Treisman’s (2007) more recent survey is bleaker still. 
“To date,” he says, “there are almost no solidly established, general empirical findings 
about the consequences of decentralization” (p. 250). The lack of consensus on 
decentralization’s effects over 25 years and literally hundreds of studies is striking.  
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One of the main challenges faced by such review efforts is the sheer size and 
diversity of scholarship. The empirical literature on decentralization originates from a 
variety of disciplines, including policy studies, public economics, development studies 
and comparative politics, to name just a few. Evaluations of reforms are done in 
markedly different ways and focus on very different outcomes, ranging from service 
delivery to corruption to macro-economic stability and happiness. Any attempt to review 
these results as a whole quickly loses the forest for the trees in a confusion of particular 
findings that may appear contradictory, but are more often simply different. To draw 
firmer conclusions from this vast literature, we argue, a clearer organizing principle is 
required – a principle that allows students of decentralization to neatly compare the 
causal effects of a similar kind of reform on similar predefined outcomes. 
In this review we apply such an organizing principle to assess decentralization’s 
ability to enhance service delivery in developing nations. Decentralization is defined 
here as “the transfer of authority for decision-making, finance, and management to 
quasi-autonomous units of local governments” (Litvack and Seddon 1999: p.3). This 
implies the transfer from national to subnational levels of government of: (i) authority 
over physical assets and human resources involved in service provision, (ii) 
responsibility for the quality of public services provided, and (iii) adequate finance to 
fund such activities – including in many cases authority to raise local taxes.  We thus 
define decentralization as similar to “democratic devolution”, per Manor (1999). As 
Devarajan et al. (2009) have noted, many decentralizations around the world are at best 
partial reforms that do not meet all of these criteria.  To increase the probability of 
comparing like with like, we limit this review to studies of decentralizations where 
authority, resources and responsibility have effectively been devolved, and exclude cases 
of partial reform.4 
It is also the case that countries decentralize different specific services and bundles of 
resources to different hierarchical levels of government. This is not least because 
countries vary hugely in size and administrative division. Rather than attempt to control 
for the fact that, for example, Indian states and cities are vastly larger than Bolivian 
departments and towns, we simply acknowledge that countries’ characteristics vary 
                                                 
4 Unless explicitly acknowledged to the contrary. 
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significantly, as do the reforms that are implemented. It is important to keep this in mind 
when generalizing from specific findings to our overall results. 
Decentralization is probably the single most advocated measure for improving the 
provision of health and education in the developing world. This popularity is not 
surprising. Of the many arguments in favor of decentralization, the most important is that 
devolving power and resources to local governments can increase the accountability of 
public servants, and hence the responsiveness of public services to citizens’ needs 
(Faguet 2008; Faguet 2012). While decentralizers’ motives have no doubt differed across 
different countries, improved delivery of public goods has been at least an implicit goal 
of most reforms, and usually an explicit one. 
To ensure that our conclusions on decentralized public provision of health and 
education are not influenced by an arbitrarily selected group of studies, we use 
predefined criteria to identify papers for inclusion in this survey. Specifically, we focus 
on quantitative studies from the last 20 years that evaluate the causal effects of 
decentralization on service delivery in developing nations. We exclude qualitative work 
not because we consider it inferior, but rather for two strong reasons: (a) The need to 
compare like with like; we know of no credible method for comparing qualitative vs. 
quantitative studies in terms of quality of evidence; (b) Space constraints. 
We group these studies according to the main substantive themes they address as 
follows: 1) Preference matching5, defined as the extent to which public goods provided 
by local governments match citizens’ preferences or demands, and/or 2) Technical 
efficiency, meaning the production of more or better public goods by a decentralized 
government for a given set of inputs. In the latter theme, we further segregate the 
evidence into sub-categories based on whether it concerns the provision of (i) health, (ii) 
education to lower tiers of the government, or (iii) education to schools in what is 
commonly referred to as a School-Based Management (SBM) reform. School-Based 
Management is a particular kind of decentralization that devolves resources and 
decision-making authority all the way down to school level, recognizing the individual 
school as the primary unit of improvement in education.6  While we would have liked to 
extend the study to further sectors, especially water and sanitation, we opt instead for 
                                                 
5 In the decentralization policy literature, the term allocative efficiency is often used to refer to this same 
concept. 
6 SBM can be thought of as significantly shortening the route of accountability, as analyzed in the World 
Bank’s 2004 World Development Report.  For further discussion, see the authoritative treatments of Bruns 
et al (2011: p. 88) and Malen et al. (1990: p. 290). 
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greater focus, which permits us to delve more deeply into the particulars of individual 
studies in these two important sectors. 
Another important theme which we cannot address adequately here is the equity 
effects of decentralization across subnational units. A significant consensus holds that 
the devolution of public funds and taxation authority should, on its own, exacerbate 
inequality amongst richer vs. poorer districts. A simple, well-understood measure can 
solve this problem: redistributive fiscal transfers aimed at decreasing horizontal 
inequalities. A large strand of the literature analyzes how such transfers can best be 
structured (Besley et al. 2003). The fact that such transfers are often not implemented 
implies that central governments choose not to do so. Why governments design such 
decentralizations falls under the much larger rubric of partial or insincere 
decentralizations, which incorporate important horizontal inequalities, vertical 
inequalities (service responsibility is devolved without adequate finance), or are 
institutionally incoherent in any of a number of ways (e.g. political responsibility for 
service provision is devolved without legal authority over the same; legal reforms are 
passed but centralized administrations remain unchanged).  Analysis of the political 
motives behind such decisions is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper.  But it is 
important to acknowledge that without adequate safeguards, decentralization can be 
expected to widen the gaps between poorer and better-off regions. 
Within our thematic classification, we further classify studies according to the self-
reported quality of their data and credibility of their identification strategies, and place 
greater weight on what high-quality evidence has to say. Distinguishing between studies 
that are able to tease out the causal effects of decentralization more plausibly than others 
is the crucial step that allows us to identify patterns in the findings. Earlier empirical 
contributions on decentralization were commonly plagued by problems of attribution – 
surveys based on such evidence therefore had similar challenges in isolating the effects 
of reform. In recent years a deeper appreciation of the pitfalls associated with causal 
inference has pushed empiricists to find more credible identification strategies that use 
observational data to construct valid counterfactuals, and thus approximate the ‘gold 
standard’ of randomized experiments7. This is the higher quality literature we focus on in 
our review. 
                                                 
7 See Angrist and Pischke 2010 for a good discussion of identification strategies. 
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The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the criteria used for 
including and classifying studies in this review. Section 3 discusses the papers included 
by theme. We conclude by comparing our findings to broad surveys of the literature and 
suggesting priorities for future research. The papers reviewed are summarized in Tables 
1 to 6. Our aim is to provide insights into patterns of findings on one piece of the larger 
decentralization puzzle. What follows hopefully helps to answer some important 
question surrounding decentralized service delivery of health and education in 
developing countries. Even so, we do not pretend that this survey can cover more than a 
fraction of a huge literature. 
2.  Scope and Methodology of Review 
This section describes the steps we undertook to identify, organize and classify 
studies from this vast literature for our review. Our strategy was to conduct a wide search 
and then systematically filter papers that met predefined criteria for relevance. Following 
this, we arranged the literature first by substantive theme, and then – crucially – by 
quality of the evidence.  
2.1 Identifying and Organizing the Literature 
Our search focused on published and unpublished working papers from 1992 and 
onwards. To ensure thorough coverage, we identified these papers using the EconLit 
bibliography, as well as by consulting other key resources such as Google Scholar, 
JSTOR, SCOPUS and Web of Knowledge. We also referred to major publications by 
international organizations such as the World Bank, used citation indices, and reviewed 
reference lists in identified papers to confirm that no critical contributions were omitted 
from our review. 
Based on the information contained in their abstracts, we short-listed those studies 
that a) were of a quantitative nature and b) dealt specifically with decentralization of 
service delivery of health and/or education in developing nations. We then organized this 
short-listed body of evidence into our two themes: preference-matching, and technical 
efficiency. The body of scholarship on technical efficiency is larger, and therefore we 
further segregated the papers examined into sub-categories based on whether they 
address: (1) decentralization of health, (2) decentralization of education to lower tiers of 
governments, or (3) decentralization of education to schools or School-Based 
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Management. Table 1 summarizes the evidence by theme, sub-category, author, 
publication type, and countries covered. 
 
Table 1 about here
2.3 Quality of the Evidence 
Next we evaluated the quality of the evidence. We did so in the knowledge that 
researchers attempting to assess the effects of decentralization on education and health 
services face a number of challenges.  These include the difficulty of disaggregating 
decentralization’s effects from those of other reforms that tend to accompany it, the time 
it takes service delivery outcomes to change, and the difficulty of conducting 
randomized decentralization experiments. Together these challenges not only impose 
sizeable data demands on researchers but also make it particularly hard to make plausible 
claims surrounding causality. 
To classify the persuasiveness of each paper’s identification strategy, we use a four 
point scale of Very Strongly Credible, Strongly Credible, Somewhat Credible, and Less 
Credible. In this categorization, we in effect rank papers’ empirical methodologies 
according to their widely accepted abilities to mitigate endogeneity concerns and identify 
causal effects. We rely primarily on the established hierarchy of identification strategies 
in economics as widely taught in graduate programs today for this ranking, although we 
do validate our final categorization by reviewing the covariates included in the analysis, 
the measures used for decentralization, the self-reported quality of data, and the nature of 
robustness checks performed in the paper. This scale, along with a snapshot of how 
papers in this survey have been classified, is presented in Table 2. The categorization is 
adapted from a similar typology by Santibañez (2006). 
 
Table 2 about here 
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Our top category, Very Strongly Credible, consists of randomized control trials 
(RCTs), the ‘gold standard’ for identifying causal effects. At the other end of the 
spectrum, work that relies on simpler quantitative methods such as ordinary least squares 
(OLS), and fails to employ any other sophisticated methodology to control for 
endogeneity bias, is categorized as having a design that is Less Credible in drawing 
causal inferences. The papers we place in this category are mostly cross-sectional OLS 
analyses of observational data, often with self-selected populations.  
The Strongly Credible category on the other hand consists of research that is 
reasonably successful in producing a valid comparison group. Much of this literature 
uses quasi-experimental techniques such as instrumental variables (IV) or difference in 
differences (DID) approaches. The key benchmark for being classed as Strongly 
Credible however is how persuasive studies are in communicating a thorough 
understanding of the institutional environment and then – importantly – using this 
understanding to design their empirical strategy. So for instance, Strongly Credible 
papers using IV techniques make plausible claims for the relevance and exogeneity of 
their instruments. Studies using difference in differences in this category persuade that 
the treatment is what is responsible for altering a trend between treatment and control 
groups. This category also contains some panel data estimations using fixed effects and a 
set of relevant covariates, but only where the case for limited endogeneity based on 
knowledge of confounding factors is particularly convincing. 
The remaining studies are classed as Somewhat Credible. In practice, this is the 
residual category, containing all remaining studies once Very Strongly, Strongly and Less 
Credible studies have been removed from the sample. What this leaves us, in our view, 
are studies that are less persuasive in addressing endogeneity than those that are Strongly 
Credible, but more convincing than the Less Credible set due to their use of various 
kinds of comparison groups. This category thus houses diverse econometric methods, 
from matching to instrumental variables. 
It is worth underlining what this survey does not seek to do. We recognize that the 
identification strategies employed by researchers are largely determined by a 
combination of the data available, the nature of the reforms implemented, and the 
nuanced questions they seek to answer. Hence we make no attempt to rank papers’ 
broader quality as pieces of research, nor to comment on the analytical skills of their 
authors. What we do seek to do, rather, is recognize that there is an established hierarchy 
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of rigor in econometric identification, and apply that hierarchy to the evidence that the 
literature provides.  This allows us to roughly categorize how convincing studies’ results 
are, and hence how we should weight evidence when making policy. 
3. The Effects of Decentralization on Education and Health 
We now move on to the heart of our review, and describe the papers included in this 
survey in some detail. We first discuss preference matching and then turn to technical 
efficiency. Throughout this section, we make use of our quality distinctions when 
describing key papers in order to allow readers to understand how our conclusions are 
drawn. 
3.1 Preference Matching  
Although preference matching is one of the classic arguments posited in favor of 
decentralization (see Oates 1972), the empirical evidence devoted exclusively to testing 
this proposition is surprisingly small. It also produces somewhat contradictory results for 
the service delivery of education on one hand, and the provision of health on the other. 
The contributions we review with Strongly Credible identification strategies examine 
reforms in Bolivia and Indonesia. Bolivia undertook devolution in 1994, and as part of 
the reform moved responsibility of key public services to local governments. The shift in 
responsibility was accompanied by two other critical changes – the doubling of funds 
available to these devolved units during this period, and the establishment of oversight 
bodies to monitor local spending.  
In one of the first papers to employ a before and after estimation strategy to examine 
preference matching, Faguet (2004; 2012) studies patterns of investment in public 
investment projects in a total of ten categories, including education and health. By doing 
so first for municipal averages, and then one by one for all municipalities examined, he 
finds a statistically significant increase in investment in education overall, as well as a 
statistically significant increase in 71% of individual municipalities in just three years 
after devolution. 
This shift in investment patterns was especially evident in poorer regions. As 
devolution increased funding to previously neglected regions, this finding however is not 
necessarily an indication of greater preference matching. But Faguet then offers further 
evidence to support his responsiveness argument – he demonstrates that regions with 
high illiteracy levels, or where there seemed to be a greater need, invested more heavily 
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in education. Regions with strong education indicators, on the other hand, prioritized 
other sectors. This, he contends, “implies that local government is more sensitive to local 
need than central government” (p. 24). The author’s optimism is supported by similar 
findings in the sectors of water management and urban development, but noticeably not 
in our second sector of interest here – health.  
However, greater spending on socially oriented sectors does not necessarily imply 
that preference matching has improved. This is the main contrasting finding in Skoufias 
et al.’s (2011) recent working paper on Indonesia. The paper exploits an arguably 
exogenous phasing of local direct elections to conduct a difference in differences 
analysis of the effect of political decentralization on the pattern of public spending.  
Although fiscal and administrative devolution commenced in 1999 in the country, in 
2005 Indonesia implemented electoral reforms to enhance accountability in service 
delivery. Skoufias et al. compare changes in expenditure patterns in districts that held 
local elections in 2005 to patterns in districts that did not hold elections until 2008. They 
find that political decentralization was associated with greater overall public spending. 
When disaggregated, however, they demonstrate that while there was an increase in the 
education sector, there was no significant difference in health spending. Skoufias et al. 
then follow Faguet (2004), attempting to use his methodology to establish whether these 
shifting patterns were based on local needs. In contrast to Faguet, they find no evidence 
to suggest an improvement in preference matching at all.     
The two contributions from the Somewhat Credible identification group are also 
contrary. In the only cross-country study concerned with preference matching that we 
review here, Arze del Granado et al. (2005) seek to establish that Faguet’s findings on 
the change in functional composition post decentralization are “not a unique experience 
of a specific country” (p. 4). Employing a similar before and after strategy, but using 
data for 45 developed and developing countries over 28 years, the authors analyze the 
relationship between the ratio of local expenditure to total government expenditure as the 
measure of decentralization, and the ratio of health and education spending to overall 
spending. They find a statistically significant relationship between decentralization and 
expenditure ratios.  Because, they assert, “implicit in the argument that decentralization 
can increase allocative efficiency is the implication that decentralization is likely to alter 
the composition of public expenditures” (Arze del Granado et al. 2005: p. 2), they 
conclude in favor of the potential of decentralization to enhance preference matching. 
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Akin et al. (2005) take a slightly different tack. They attempt to provide a deeper 
understanding of spending allocations within the health sector after a decentralization 
reform occurred in Uganda. The authors postulate a model in which users undervalue 
public-type health goods such as family planning, health education, immunization and 
infectious disease control. Because local governments will be more responsive to the 
preferences revealed by their residents for private-type health goods, the authors posit 
that districts will under-provide public-type health care and ignore spillover effects on 
neighboring regions if they are not under the same jurisdiction.  
Akin et al.’s theory is borne out in the district-level data they examine from Uganda. 
They find, after controlling for per capita income in a fixed effects model, that 
decentralization is associated with higher budgeting of private-type health goods. 
Moreover, Akin et al. also cite evidence in favor of crowding-out effects – districts 
whose neighbors budget higher amounts on public-type goods budget less on such goods 
themselves. On the basis of this evidence, Akin et al. (2005: p.3) pessimistically call for 
“A reappraisal of the central government’s role in providing public goods in developing 
countries”.  
What is interesting, however, is that their argument is not one against the preference 
matching effects of decentralization per se, as they assume local governments are indeed 
responding to local inclinations in Uganda. Rather, their pessimism arises from the result 
of the responsiveness versus spillover effects trade-off. The Oates Decentralization 
Theorem (1972) suggests that devolution is superior only so long as there are no 
spillover effects. In the presence of spillover effects, the theoretical prediction for 
preference matching of decentralization is ambiguous or even negative (Besley and 
Coate 2003; Bardhan and Mookherjee 1998).  
The papers with Less Credible empirical designs take Akin et al.’s pessimism even 
further. Schwartz et al. (2002), for instance, examine the trends in spending composition 
of health services in 1600 regions in the Philippines to show, like Akin et al., a shift in 
local spending composition from public-type health services to private-type curative 
health care. Along a similar vein, Hasnain (2008) considers budget allocation trends in 
Pakistan’s province of Punjab and reports that decentralized local governments are 
prioritizing allocations for infrastructure over those for health and education. And in 
sharp contrast to all of the studies above, Frienkman and Plekhanov (2009) do not find a 
change in allocation patterns after decentralization in Russia at all. The authors use a 
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between effects model on cross-sectional data to conclude that fiscal decentralization is 
not significantly associated with an investment in education inputs.  
So what, if anything, can we take away from this short review of the evidence of 
decentralization’s ability to enhance preference matching? The literature in this theme is 
small, and the number of high quality contributions is even smaller. But studies across 
the quality distinctions appear to mostly concur that decentralization changes the patterns 
of local spending. On the other hand, whether or not these changes are responsive to 
local needs is an area where there is less agreement. While the evidence appears 
somewhat encouraging for enhanced preference matching in education, contributions in 
the area of health are decidedly pessimistic due both to a lack of visible change in 
allocation patterns and the possibility of externalities in the area.  
 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 
3.2 Technical Efficiency 
The body of work on the ability of decentralization to enhance technical efficiency in 
the delivery of education and health fortunately is much larger than that found in the 
previous theme. Strikingly, it is also more rigorous, and fairly optimistic of the potential 
of decentralization to improve service delivery. 
3.2.1 Health  
The lone paper with a Strongly Credible empirical strategy in this sub-category, for 
instance, provides the first piece of evidence strongly in favor of decentralization’s 
ability to enhance technical efficiency in health delivery.   
Uchimura and Jutting (2009) examine the interesting case of China, a country that 
has had consistently high levels of spending decentralization, but a growing 
recentralization of revenue decisions since 1994. Improving on previous studies that use 
only province-level data, Uchimura and Jutting employ data from counties in 26 
provinces over a seven year period. Counties in China have responsibility for 
implementing health programs. However, local government officials are elected through 
parties, not the adult franchise, which limits political accountability of officials to 
citizens.  
The authors determine the statistical relationship between two measures of county-
level fiscal decentralization and the outcome of provincial infant mortality rates (IMR),  
using a fixed effects model. Finding statistically significant and negative coefficients in 
most of the other models they tested, the authors conclude that counties in more fiscally 
decentralized provinces have lower IMR. Interactions between their two measures of 
decentralization – own expenditure financed and proportion of provincial expenditure - 
are also positive. This suggests to the authors that IMRs are lower in provinces not only 
where fiscal capacity is strengthened, but also where counties and provinces have a 
functional transfer system in place.     
Two contributions from the group with Somewhat Credible evidence are also 
positive. In a study quite similar to the above, Asfaw et al. (2007) consider empirical 
evidence on rural infant mortality rates from India. Decentralization in India has a long 
history. But, it took its current form with the passing of the 1989 Panchayat Raj bill and 
later constitutional amendments in the early 1990s that devolved power to the traditional 
village organizations or Panchayats. Panchayats now form a part of the local 
government, hold elections, and bear responsibility for health and education delivery. 
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Evidence suggests, however, that different states have followed differing models of 
devolution, making comparative analysis of the reform difficult. 
 Nonetheless, Asfaw et al. attempt to estimate the role of devolution in affecting the 
outcome of rural infant mortality rates using data from 14 states over seven years. The 
authors demonstrate a statistically significant and negative relationship between 
decentralization and IMR in both their random and fixed effects models, but not in the 
between-effects model. Asfaw et al. (2007) conclude that having an above average 
decentralization index is associated with a 17.16% reduction as compared to states with 
below average fiscal decentralization scores. The results hold when the measure of 
decentralization is altered, when decentralization indices are made continuous measures 
and also when two year averages of IMR are used.  
The final positive single country study we review here is due to Habibi et al. (2003) 
who consider devolution of basic health and education (see also next section) services in 
Argentina. In their paper, Habibi et al. use nationwide data from over a 25 year period to 
examine the relationship between two measures of fiscal decentralization and the infant 
mortality rate. The authors find a significant and negative relationship between the 
parameters of interest. On the basis of these findings, they conclude that devolution can 
have positive effects on human development, especially when there is greater tax 
accountability in a province.  
Less optimistically, Inchauste (2009) reports Bolivian evidence from the first half of 
the 2000s in the context of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, which 
directed resources saved from repayment of debt to local governments based on poverty 
levels. Although she shows that there has been increased investment in both health and 
education, she does not find a significant association between the number of poor in a 
municipality and HIPC transfers, and thus argues that HIPC funds have not been targeted 
well.  
Using a random effects model, Inchauste also examines the relationship between the 
change in health spending and (1) the change in share of unattended illnesses and (2) the 
unattended cases of respiratory diseases, finding a significant decline in the former and 
no significant change in the latter. Inchauste argues that there has been a lack of 
improvement in social indicators based on this mixed result, as well as on the results on 
education which we discuss in the next section. But the lack of pre-reform data imply 
16 of 30 
 
that her results may say more about administration of the HIPC initiative than about 
decentralization per se. 
What cross-country evidence do we have of associations of decentralization and 
health service delivery? Two notable studies over the past decade investigate the impact 
of decentralization on health service delivery, finding somewhat mixed results that 
appear to depend crucially on the level of development of a nation.  
In an oft-cited paper, Robalino et al. (2001) perform a cross-country data regression, 
using IMR as the dependent variable and fiscal decentralization as the independent 
variable. Their sample, though not expressly given in their paper, comprises between 45-
70 low and high income countries and they rely on data from GFS.  
Robalino et al.’s fixed effects model yields a significant and negative relationship 
between the key measures of interest. In their basic model, if a country with a GDP per 
capita of USD 2000 increases its share of expenditures managed by local governments 
by 10%, this would be associated with a 3.6% decrease in mortality rates. Robalino et al. 
also find evidence to show that the benefits associated with fiscal decentralization may 
have a U shaped curve with respect to GDP per capita, implying that countries with low 
and high incomes are more likely to benefit from the reform than middle income 
countries. They conclude that decentralization benefits are “particularly important for 
poor countries” (Robalino et al. 2001: p. 11).    
According to Khalegian (2004), on other hand, the benefit curve is L shaped for 
immunization. Using data on 140 low and middle income countries over 18 years, he 
conducts a cross-country regression of a measure of decentralization against 
immunization rates against measles and diphtheria. Unlike other papers in this area, 
Khalegian uses a political, not a fiscal measure of decentralization, sourced primarily 
from the Database of Political Institutions. Here, decentralization is measured as a binary 
variable, indicating whether or not local governments have authority for taxing, spending 
and regulation although measures of fiscal decentralization from GFS are also employed 
in the regression.  
The author notes positive and significant coefficients for lower income decentralized 
countries in his main specification which uses between effects and time dummies – 
decentralization is associated with 8.8% and 8.3% increase in diphtheria and measles 
coverage, respectively. In middle income countries, however, this reverses and 
decentralization is associated with a decrease in diphtheria and measles coverage of 
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4.9% and 5.5% respectively.  Analysis indicates that the turning point is per capita GDP 
of 1400 (in 1995 USD), after which a negative relationship stabilizes.  
Khalegian’s outlook based on these results is mixed – after exploring some channels, 
he proposes that the difference between the results seen in lower and middle income 
countries can be attributed to the possibility that poorer countries decentralize less fully 
than middle income ones. This implies that were complete devolution to occur, we 
would see a negative impact on immunization. The author uses this to encourage 
continued central government support of health initiatives.  
In the Less Credible category, Treisman (2002) uses OLS regression on cross-
sectional multi-country data to show that decentralization’s effects may be sensitive to 
the income level of a country. Using data on 166 countries, Treisman explores how 
having constitutional sub-national authority relates to two indicators of health care 
performance – the share of infants inoculated for diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis, and 
the share of population for which 20 essential drugs are available and affordable. Once 
an extensive set of socio-economic controls are added, the paper’s findings are not 
significant for sub-national authority, although greater electoral accountability is 
correlated with better access to medicines. In his analysis, nations with per capita GNP 
greater than USD 5000 have worse service delivery performance than their counterparts 
with lower per capita GNP.  
In sum, while the body of scholarship in this sub-category is larger than that in 
preference matching, it is still rather thin. Moreover, high credibility contributions are 
also rare. That said, the three country studies of Strongly Credible or Somewhat Credible 
empirical strategies all demonstrate the ability of health decentralization to have a 
positive influence on infant mortality rates. The same is not necessarily true for 
immunization, although we are forced to draw this conclusion on the basis of two cross-
country studies with less convincing methodologies. 
 
Table 4 about here 
3.2.2 Education  
Amongst studies of education, two papers of high quality set the stage for prevalent 
optimism. In the first, Galiani et al. (2008) examine decentralization in Argentina by 
comparing changes in student test scores in secondary schools that have always been 
under provincial control to changes in schools that were under federal control until the 
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1991 reform. Like many other Latin American countries, Argentina undertook 
devolution to provinces as part of a broader structural reform, first devolving 
responsibility for pre-schools and primary schools, and then undertaking the same 
reform for secondary schools. Provinces now have authority over personnel and 
budgeting decisions, while schools are largely responsible for textbook selection and 
teaching methods.   
Using average school test scores from a sample of students tested in almost 99% of 
the secondary school universe, Galiani et al. compare the change in outcomes in those 
schools that were decentralized to changes in those schools that were always provincial. 
Because the impact on scores is unlikely to be immediate, the authors estimate the 
impact of exposure to decentralized schools for up to five years by cohort. Their results 
show a positive association between decentralization and Mathematics and Spanish 
scores - after five years, a 4.9% and 6.9% increase compared to the mean, respectively. 
In a comparable paper with a solid methodological design, Faguet and Sánchez (2008) 
use changes in enrolment rates in state schools as the measure of student achievement in 
order to evaluate the impact of decentralization on service delivery in Colombia. They 
analyze the impact of a phased decentralization reform in the country, which not only 
left local governments responsible for provision of public services but also provided 
them increased fiscal powers to fulfill this responsibility. Using both OLS and IV, they 
find that measures of decentralization have a significant and positive correlation with 
changes in student enrolment, with the effects being larger for smaller municipalities.  
The larger Somewhat Credible category fuels further enthusiasm for decentralized 
education delivery. In a paper discussed earlier under Health Technical Efficiency, 
Habibi et al. (2003) report the empirical relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
the ratio of students enrolled in secondary school per 1000 primary students. Using 
Argentine data from 1970-1994 in a fixed effects model, the authors find that their 
measure of decentralization - own resources to total resources - has a positive and 
significant association with their measure of education output.    
Freinkman and Plenakanov’s (2009) examination of the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on student scores in Russia presents the only comparison of preference 
matching and technical efficiency of decentralization that we have come across in this 
review. The authors evaluate the statistical relationship between test scores of students 
from 73 regions in Russia tested in 2004 and 2005 and fiscal decentralization of a region. 
19 of 30 
 
The 1994 reforms passed responsibility of key public services to local governments, 
giving them control over 80% of social spending on health and education. The authors 
exploit regional variances to estimate the impact of decentralization in a between effects 
model to report results that are rather interesting. They find that the change in spending 
on education was marginal with no significant impact of decentralization variables on 
computers, pre-school years or student teacher ratios. However, the relationship between 
student outcomes, as measured by an average of Language and Mathematics test scores, 
and decentralization is consistently positive in all of their specifications. A 10 percentage 
point increase in own revenues of municipalities is significantly correlated with 30 
percent of one standard deviation improvement in secondary school exam scores. Taken 
together, they propose that their results are consistent with a technical efficiency 
argument arising from accountability and local official incentives, rather than allocative 
efficiency of increased inputs into the education production process.  
Aslam and Yilmaz (2011) are similarly positive about decentralization, and support 
their arguments with analysis conducted on a unique dataset collected from 183 
randomly selected villages in 5 purposively chosen districts in Pakistan. Pakistan 
embarked on an ambitious decentralization program in 2001, which left local 
governments responsible for basic service delivery, although many scholars note that 
devolution over fiscal and personnel management was limited.  
The authors construct a measure of education service delivery by collecting 
retrospective data from villagers on changes in capital improvements, school 
maintenance and education services during the period 1995 to 2007. They then regress a 
composite measure of these indicators on a dummy variable for decentralization using a 
fixed effects model, to find that provision of education increased dramatically after the 
introduction of the decentralization reform.  
Can we conclude that decentralization enhances technical efficiency in education 
based on the above? Inchauste (2009) would disagree. Her examination of the 
relationship between changes in education allocations, and children not attending school 
and un-enrolled children in Bolivia, shows limited support for devolution. Using data 
over a slightly longer period than her analysis of health indicators (see above), her results 
for funds made available to local governments through the HIPC initiative are again 
mixed. She finds that increases in education transfers were associated with a decrease in 
children not attending school in the 1999-2002 period, but an increase in unenrolled 
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children in 2002-2005. The impact of education spending in both periods, and on other 
intermediate education indicators, is not significant.     
The lower quality evidence, primarily simple regression analysis on cross-sectional 
data, is likewise mixed. Some of the contributions, nonetheless, do present noteworthy 
findings. One example is Di Gropello (2002), which shows conflicting results on the 
impact of municipality level and school level devolution on student test scores in Chile. 
Using an education production function design for testing conducted in 1996, Di 
Gropello regresses the outcome of student test scores on a measure of fiscal 
decentralization, school level parameters of autonomy and participation, and some 
controls commonly found in the education economics literature. Both devolved wage 
incentives and training expenditure at the municipal level are associated with higher test 
scores, while greater financial autonomy as measured by municipal own funds spent on 
education to total funds spent on education is not. At the school level, Di Gropello finds 
that coefficients of involvement in financial and pedagogical decision-making are 
significant and positively associated with student test scores.  
By contrast, Lockheed and Zhao (1993)’s review from the Philippines is decisively 
negative. By comparing national, private and municipal or baranguay-run schools and 
controlling for socio-economic background, they find no significant difference in 
attitudes or achievement in science or mathematics. They argue that this is due to little 
actual control and resources being devolved to local schools, presenting the “empty 
opportunity of decentralization” in the country. Treisman (2002) is equally pessimistic in 
the only cross-country evidence we review in this sub-category. He finds that the 
presence of constitutional autonomy and electoral accountability at the local level were 
both associated with a higher level of youth illiteracy in data from up to 166 nations. In 
line with his findings in the area of health, the negative associations he reports are 
stronger for countries with GNP per capita greater than USD 5,000.    
In summary, this sub-category is not only larger than the previous ones, but also 
significantly more positive about decentralization’s effects, especially when adjusted for 
quality of evidence. Although the marginal increase in number of contributions comes 
from studies falling in the middle quality distinction, they are almost unanimous in their 
support of decentralization’s ability to enhance both the quality and quantity of 
education. 
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3.2.3 School-Based Management (SBM)  
As indicated by a number of recent reviews, the literature in this category has made 
considerable progress. We provide a basic examination of the most important pieces of 
works in this literature below, but also refer readers to Galiani and Perez-Truglia (2011); 
Bruns et al (2011); and Barrera-Osorio et al. (2009) for more comprehensive reviews8. 
What does ‘gold standard’ evidence tell us about the effectiveness of SBM reforms? 
Two recent experimental contributions, and the only ones to be categorized as having 
Very Strongly Credible research designs in our review, investigate SBM’s potential in 
enhancing student attainment. They yield contradictory findings. 
The more optimistic evidence comes from Duflo et al.’s (2007) paper on a 
randomized control trial in Western Kenya. The trial tested a number of interventions on 
a total of 210 primary schools, one of which involved an SBM component that 
empowered school councils to hire and monitor contract teachers. Duflo et al. compare 
the SBM groups to their counterparts in the control group, to show that students in the 
treatment cell scored 0.18 and 0.24 standard deviations higher in Mathematics and 
Language than their non-treated counterparts two years following the intervention.  
On the other hand, Glewwe and Maiga (2011) present less optimistic experimental 
results. They examine a randomized trial in Madagascar, which involved management 
reforms at three levels – district, sub-district and school. In a sample of 30 districts, sub-
districts and schools were randomly sorted into treatment and control groups. Glewwe 
and Maiga document some school improvements in the first six months, but by the end 
of two years find no discernible impact on aggregated test scores. They conclude not 
against the reform per se, arguing instead that results may be driven by the short time 
since intervention. Their conclusion is consistent with suggestions in the SBM literature 
from the US that reforms may take up to five years to affect student test scores (see 
Borman et al. 2003).  
The four studies that rely on the quasi-experimental technique of difference in 
differences, on the other hand, are unanimously favorable. The former two we classify 
under the Strongly Credible quality distinction, while the latter two are deemed to have 
                                                 
8 For good reviews of this literature from developed countries, see Summers and Johnson (1994) and 
Borman et al. (2003). See also a related and relatively more rigorous literature on charter and grant-
maintained schools from the US and UK respectively e.g. Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) and Clark (2009). 
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Somewhat Credible identification strategies primarily as a result of challenges they face 
with the key parallel trend assumption required in a thorough DID analysis.  
The strongest paper of this type is due to Gertler et al. (2011), who consider the AGE 
(Apoyo a la Gestión Escolar) intervention from Mexico. AGE is an SBM reform that 
provides training and small grants to parent associations in disadvantaged schools to 
invest in infrastructure and materials. Gertler et al. exploit the phased implementation of 
the AGE program to achieve identification, comparing schools that adopted AGE earlier 
to those that adopted it later. Their analysis suggests that participation in the AGE 
program is associated with a 0.6 and 0.4 percentage point reduction in failure and 
repetition rates, respectively. This translates to a 4% and 5.4% decrease in these 
respective indicators. The authors find no significant association between AGE and 
intra-year drop-out rates. Through qualitative research, the paper also suggests that the 
channel for improvement is the increased participation of parents in decision-making.  
In the second study of this type, Skoufias and Shapiro (2006) also use a difference in 
differences method but combine it with a matching technique to examine a different 
intervention from Mexico. They consider the PEC (Programa Escuelas de Calidad) 
program, another SBM type reform which provides annual grants to disadvantaged 
schools to improve education quality. The program gave up to a five-year USD 15k 
grant to the 20,000 schools, or 10% of the schooling system, that volunteered to 
participate. Like other SBM reforms, school councils participated in the design, 
implementation and monitoring of the improvement plans that the grants financed. The 
authors use data for approximately 75,000 schools to first conduct a simpler OLS, and 
then a difference in differences with matching estimation. Employing this mix of 
methods, they find that PEC participation is significantly associated with a 0.24, 0.24 
and 0.31 reduction in dropout, failure and repetition rate, respectively. The impact, it 
should be noted, is marginal and represents a 6% to 8% reduction relative to the baseline 
means.  
Paes de Barros and Mendonca (1998)’s study of the three key SBM changes in 
Brazil of financial autonomy of schools, head teacher election and establishment of 
school councils employs one of the first difference in differences methodologies seen in 
the field. The authors examine changes in a series of outputs by using data from 
education censuses during the 1981-1993 period. Their methodology relies on 
estimating, over this period of time, the change in states that received an innovation 
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against the change in groups that did not receive an innovation. Their findings suggest 
that financial autonomy is associated with a significant drop in repetition rates. Similarly 
positive trends are evident when the authors examine mean level lags in grades attended 
and share of children with lag – the former is negatively and significantly associated with 
school financial autonomy and the presence of school councils, while the latter has a 
negative and significant correlation with school council presence only.  
Also supportive is the only investigation from Asia that we review in this sub-
category. In a recent World Bank working paper, Khattri et al (2010) evaluate the impact 
of school-based management reforms implemented in 2003 in 23 districts in the 
Philippines. The program, sponsored by the World Bank, involved providing training to 
principals and parents in designing School Improvement Plans, in addition to direct 
funding for the improvements planned. Implementation of the program was in three 
phases, with early selection based primarily on a perception of school capability. Using 
data from the period 2003 to 2005, Khattri et al. compare the test score performance of 
students in schools that implemented the intervention in the first phase to those that 
implemented the intervention in a later phase. In comparison to the control group, the 
treatment group showed a 1.45 percentage point improvement in overall student 
attainment. For the subjects of Science, English and Mathematics, the improvements 
were 1.45, 1.32 and 1.88 percentage points, respectively.  
In contrast to the above papers, the rest of the Somewhat Credible identification 
strategy category has mixed findings. The two cross-country studies on SBM are 
negative. Gunnarsson et al. (2009) evaluate the effects of School-Based Management 
reforms in 10 Latin American countries. School autonomy and participation, two 
indicators that have been popularly used by many other authors working on SBM, are 
measured for the various countries using survey data from 1997 and then quantified 
using factor analysis. The authors support their OLS analysis by instrumenting for 
autonomy and participation using principal attributes and legal structure. After first 
noting the variation in autonomy and participation across countries, they find a negative 
and significant association between school autonomy and test scores. They do, however, 
find a positive relationship of test scores with parental participation.  
The second cross-country study comes from a recent contribution by Hanushek et al. 
(2011) who use data from four waves of PISA test scores to establish the relationship 
between student achievement and autonomy in curricular, personnel and budgeting 
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areas. Their dataset contains test scores and background data on 1 million students from 
42 countries, of which 25 are classified as high income nations. Using a two way fixed 
effects model, Hanushek et al. find the relationship between the parameters of interest to 
be negative, albeit heterogeneous across countries based on income levels. A 
disaggregated analysis suggests that school autonomy is related to positive outcomes in 
developed and high-performing nations, but to negative ones in developing and low-
performing nations.  
Hanushek et al.’s study suggests that understanding when SBM can be effective is 
critical. King and Ozler’s (2000) paper on Nicaragua’s reform provides an interesting 
answer to this question by arguing that it is de facto and not de jure school autonomy 
that improves student performance. Nicaragua’s school autonomy intervention was 
implemented in 1991 and allowed Nicaraguan schools to sign contracts with the 
Ministry of Education to become autonomous. Autonomous schools were meant to work 
through school councils, which had de jure control to hire and fire teachers, manage 
school budgets and maintain infrastructure. King and Ozler use a number of models to 
estimate the impact of both de jure autonomy measured by the signing of a contract, and 
de facto autonomy measured by factor analysis of teacher’s responses. Their matched 
comparison design strategy compares similar treated and non-treated schools to show 
that de facto autonomy is associated with higher test scores in Mathematics and Spanish, 
but de jure autonomy has no significant impact.  
Parker (2005) provides more support for the case of the Nicaraguan autonomy 
reform, using more nationally representative data that she contends is less prone to 
student attrition bias than King and Ozler’s (2000) analysis. Her results are however 
mixed – after controlling for the standard components of an education production 
function, she finds that third graders in autonomous schools scored significantly higher 
than their counterparts in centralized schools in Mathematics. But for sixth graders the 
effect is negative for Mathematics, and in neither case are results significant for Spanish.   
Also relying on cross-sectional analysis, Jimenez and Sawada (1999) study EDUCO, 
perhaps the most celebrated case of SBM, and find no significant difference in test 
scores. EDUCO (Educación con Participación de la Comunidad) was first implemented 
in 1991 and has served as a model for many of the community-run schools in the Latin 
American region. The program established community schools to enhance access in 
rural areas in El Salvador following the end of civil war. EDUCO schools are run by 
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councils consisting of elected community members called Associations for Community 
Education (ACE), which have considerable authority in hiring/firing teachers, setting 
school curriculum and monitoring school performance. The authors employ one of the 
first education production functions in the field to assess the impact of decentralization 
on student test scores, albeit for a fairly small sample of 600 students tested in 1996. 
They find no significant difference in test scores between traditional and EDUCO 
students. Given that EDUCO students come from disadvantaged backgrounds, the 
authors consider this a positive result. They also find evidence that student absenteeism 
is lower in EDUCO schools. 
In a more recent paper, Sawada and Ragatz (2005) use propensity score matching on 
the same dataset, and still find no impact on student test scores. They do, nonetheless, 
report evidence of significantly lower teacher absenteeism in EDUCO schools. The 
authors propose that lower absenteeism arises as the result of improved community 
monitoring, and the authority of councils to hire/ fire teachers. Evidence shows that 
ACEs of EDUCO schools use incentives for renewable contracts to motivate this 
outcome among teachers. Their finding is supported by other studies that compare 
absenteeism rates of permanent and contract teachers, especially in India, to show that 
the community monitoring aspect is critical in enhancing outcomes (see for example 
Ramachandran et al. 2005; Banerjee and Duflo 2006). 
Di Gropello and Marshall (2005) employ a methodology similar to Jimenez and 
Sawada (1999) to assess the impact of participating in a PROHECO (Proyecto 
Hondureño de Educación Comunitaria) community school in Honduras. PROHECO 
schools were first established in 1999 in order to enhance primary school access in rural 
areas. Unlike more traditional schools, they are run almost entirely by school councils 
which are legal entities that set budgets, maintain school infrastructure and perform key 
personnel management functions including hiring, monitoring and paying. Their results 
point to marginally lower dropout and repetition rates in SBM schools.  
The only study in this category with a Less Credible identification method is one 
from Argentina, which nonetheless demonstrates findings of interest. Eskeland and 
Filmer (2007) perform a simple OLS regression using an expanded education production 
function to investigate the impact of an education devolution reform that left many key 
education decisions decentralized to the municipal and school level. Exploiting cross-
sectional data containing test scores of over 24,000 6th and 7th grade students across the 
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nation, the authors present one of the first attempts to explore the interdependent nature 
of autonomy and participation by using an interaction model. Eskeland and Filmer find 
that autonomy is significantly associated with student test scores in Mathematics, but not 
in Language. They contend that participation has no independent effect on scores, but 
that its interaction with autonomy is positive and significant. 
In summary, studies with credible identification strategies appear to consistently 
support school decentralization’s ability to improve repetition, failure and even drop-out 
rates. Results on student test scores, however, are mixed in both higher quality and 
medium quality evidence. Interestingly, authors have as a consequence tried to consider 
when SBM may be successful. This effort has yielded diverse results suggesting efficacy 
particularly in developed countries, or in schools with de facto autonomy, or even in the 
presence of both autonomy and participation together. The scholarship on this latter 
aspect, however, is too small to draw firmer conclusions. 
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4.  Conclusions 
Many scholars have noted that the evidence on decentralization’s effects is weak, 
incomplete and generally inconclusive (Rondinelli, Cheema and Nellis 1983, Manor 
1999, Smoke 2001, Litvack et al. 1999, Treisman 2007). But when we organize the 
empirical literature first by theme and then – crucially – by quality of evidence provided, 
we are able to identify patterns of empirical results that previous surveys – including our 
own9 – have missed. Admittedly, these patterns are not conclusive across all areas of 
interest. But in many instances they show that reforms can have clear, positive 
consequences – in some cases remarkably so, as we have attempted to outline above. 
This is very different from the general indeterminacy that previous surveys find, and 
particularly important to the extent that evidence informs real world policy-making. 
Our findings can be summarized as follows: 
The overall evidence base is thin, although this varies by category 
We find that the overall evidence base on decentralized health and service delivery in 
developing countries is thin. Only 35 studies meet the selection criteria detailed in 
section 2.  We also find that the distribution of scholarship is skewed by theme 
(preference matching vs. technical efficiency) and sub-category (health, education, 
SBM). For example, many more studies focus on how decentralization affects technical 
efficiency than preference matching. Likewise, education and SBM have been the 
subject of examination much more often than health. 
The econometric techniques used are less sophisticated than we would prefer 
Fewer than a third of the papers reviewed can be classified as having a highly 
credible identification strategy. Our categorization hinges on the ability of the 
methodologies employed to mitigate endogeneity concerns, in accordance with the 
established hierarchy of econometric techniques.  Hence, for example, randomized and 
quasi-randomized evidence are considered to have stronger identification strategies than 
cross-sectional work. In this particular sense, the “quality” of the studies reviewed also 
varies substantially by theme and sub-category. Papers in the technical efficiency theme, 
and specifically studies investigating school decentralization reforms, appear to have a 
greater number of high quality contributions. By contrast, contributions in the preference 
                                                 
9 See for example Faguet (2008), Faguet and Ali (2009), and Faguet and Sánchez (2008). 
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matching category are not only fewer but also less rigorous, making the task of drawing 
conclusions from this group difficult. 
Externalities in health drive pessimism in the preference matching theme 
Our review indicates that pessimism in the small preference matching literature is 
due primarily to the externalities that characterize the health sector. Decentralized local 
governments often match local preferences more efficiently while ignoring spillover 
effects on neighboring regions, as some of the classic public economics literature 
predicts (Oates 1972; Rubinfeld 1987), thus reducing overall social welfare. The 
evidence of preference matching in education delivery, on the other hand, appears to be 
somewhat positive. But the small size of this body of work limits firmer conclusions. 
Higher quality work on technical efficiency appears to be favorable 
Importantly, evidence on technical efficiency is on the whole optimistic. This 
optimism rises with the quality of the evidence. The highest quality empirics show that 
decentralization can enhance a variety of service delivery outcomes, from student test 
scores to infant mortality rates. Although such results are not conclusive, they do 
demonstrate the potential of decentralization to enhance service delivery in developing 
countries. Stronger conclusions are not possible until the field sees a more general shift 
towards better research design, and the development of a deeper understanding of the 
prerequisites and mechanisms of successful reforms. 
It is difficult to step away from our review without reiterating the methodological 
challenges faced by empiricists in this arena. Undoubtedly, scarce data, big bang 
implementation and all-encompassing reform packages make it difficult to disentangle 
the causal effects of decentralized service delivery. The weaknesses of evidence pointed 
out above are not shortcomings of logic, less still of skill on the part of researchers.  
Rather, they are direct consequences of a combination of the data limitations that we all 
work under, plus the complexity of the questions we seek to answer. 
The last decade has seen great improvements in identification as better data has 
become available, and more recently years have brought us the first randomized trials in 
the field. Understandably, implementing RCTs in the broader education and health 
decentralization reform is a challenging task, but one with great potential moving 
forward. For political and administrative reasons, RCTs have particular potential for 
assessing decentralization at lower administrative levels, such as municipalities and 
SBM. Other possibilities could add to the credibility of the research base. Early 
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involvement of researchers together with cooperation with government agencies, for 
example, can allow for quasi-randomized design in decentralization to regional, local 
and school levels. And the use of panel data can help mitigate many of the econometric 
challenges associated with cross-sectional work. Along these lines, subnational variation 
can be exploited to ask further, deeper questions about the effects of citizen organization 
and mobilization (i.e. “social capital”) at local and school levels, and their effects on 
such variables as corruption, accountability, service efficiency and health and education 
outcomes.  As this body of work grows, it will become possible to draw firmer 
conclusions on the effects of decentralization on service provision. 
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Approximately around page 5 
Table 1: Summary of Evidence Reviewed  
No. Region/ Country Author By Theme By Sector By Type of Publication 
      PM TE Health Educ. SBM Journal Book Working 
Paper 
Other 
  Africa                     
1 Kenya Duflo et al (2007)   X     X       X 
2 Madagascar Glewwe and Maiga (2011)   X     X X       
3 Uganda Akin et al (2005) X   X     X       
  Asia                     
4 China Uchimura and Jutting (2009)   X X     X       
5 India Asfaw et al (2007)   X X     X       
6 Indonesia Skoufias et al (2011) X   X X       X   
7 Pakistan Hasnain (2008) X   X X       X   
8 Pakistan Aslam and Yilmaz (2011)   X   X   X       
9 Philippines Schwartz et al (2002) X   X           X 
10 Philippines Jimenez and Paqueo (1996)   X   X   X       
11 Philippines Lockheed and Zhao (1993)   X   X   X       
12 Philippines Khattri et al (2010)   X     X     X   
13 Russia Frienkman and Plekhanov (2009) X X   X   X       
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Table 1: Summary of Evidence Reviewed  
No. Region/ Country Author By Theme By Sector By Type of Publication 
      PM TE Health Educ. SBM Journal Book Working 
Paper 
Other 
  Latin & Central America                   
14 Argentina Habibi et al (2003)   X X X   X       
15 Argentina Galiani et al (2008)   X   X   X       
16 Argentina Eskeland and Filmer (2007)   X     X     X   
17 Bolivia Faguet (2004) X   X X   X       
18 Bolivia Inchauste (2009)   X X X     X     
19 Brazil Paes de Barros and Mendonca (1998) X     X X       
20 Chile Di Gropello (2002)   X   X X X       
21 Colombia Faguet and Sanchez (2008)   X   X   X       
22 El Salvador Jimenez and Sawada (1999)   X     X X       
23 El Salvador Sawada and Ragatz (2005)   X     X   X     
24 Honduras Di Gropello and Marshall (2005)   X     X   X     
25 Mexico Gertler et al (2011)   X     X X       
26 Mexico Skoufias and Shapiro (2006)   X     X     X   
27 Nicaragua King and Ozler (2000)   X     X     X   
28 Nicaragua Parker (2005)   X     X   X     
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Table 1: Summary of Evidence Reviewed  
No. Region/ Country Author By Theme By Sector By Type of Publication 
      PM TE Health Educ. SBM Journal Book Working 
Paper 
Other 
  Cross-country                     
29 Various Arze del Granado et al (2005) X   X X       X   
30 Various Gunnarsson et al (2009)   X   X   X       
31 Various Hanushek et al (2011)   X     X     X   
32 Various Khaleghian (2004)   X X     X       
33 Various Robalino et al (2001)   X   X       X   
34 Various Treisman (2002)   X X X         X 
  Total   7 28 12 16 14 18 4 9 3 
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Approximately around page 6 
Table 2: Quality Distinctions and the Weight of the Evidence 
Scale Criteria Preference Matching Technical Efficiency 
      Generally Positive 
Findings 
  Generally Insignificant 
or Negative Findings 
Generally Positive 
Findings 
Generally Insignificant or 
Negative Findings 
RANK 1: 
Very Strongly 
Credible 
Identification 
Strategy 
▪ Research that contains a valid comparison 
group  
▪ Work that is likely to have extremely 
limited endogeneity concerns 
▪ Studies such as randomized control trials 
fall in this category  
 
H
ea
lt
h
       
Ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
      
SB
M
 
     
▪ Duflo et al (2007) 
 
▪ Glewwe and Maiga (2011) 
RANK 2: 
Strongly 
Credible 
Identification 
Strategy 
▪ Research that is able to construct a 
reasonable comparison group 
▪ Work that specifically attempts to address 
sources of endogeneity and is mostly 
successful in its attempt  
▪ Studies using quasi-experimental designs 
such as difference in differences and 
H
ea
lt
h
 
 
 
   
▪ Faguet (2004) 
▪ Skoufias et al (2011) 
 
▪ Uchimura and Jutting 
(2009) 
  
Ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
 
▪ Faguet (2004) 
▪ Skoufias et al 
(2011) 
   
 
 
▪ Galiani et al (2008) 
▪ Faguet and Sanchez 
(2008) 
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Table 2: Quality Distinctions and the Weight of the Evidence 
Scale Criteria Preference Matching Technical Efficiency 
      Generally Positive 
Findings 
  Generally Insignificant 
or Negative Findings 
Generally Positive 
Findings 
Generally Insignificant or 
Negative Findings 
instrumental variables fall in this category  
▪ Studies using panel estimates in a fixed 
effects model while controlling for more 
than one socio-economic covariate and 
more than one covariate from the 
health/education production function may 
also fall here 
SB
M
 
 
 
   
 
 
▪ Skoufias and Shapiro 
(2006) 
▪ Gertler et al (2011) 
▪ Hanushek et al (2011) 
 
  
RANK 3: 
Somewhat 
Credible 
Identification 
Strategy 
▪ Research that attempts to construct a 
comparison group but with limited success  
▪ Work that is likely to continue to suffer 
from some endogeneity biases in spite of 
efforts at mitigation 
▪ Studies based on cross-sectional data but 
using specific techniques to create a 
comparison groups fall in this category  
H
ea
lt
h
 
  
▪ Arze del Granado 
et al (2005) 
   
▪ Akin et al (2005) 
 
▪ Asfaw et al (2007) 
▪ Robalino et al (2001) 
▪ Habibi et al (2003) 
 
▪ Inchauste (2009) 
▪ Khaleghian (2004) 
Ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
 
▪ Arze del Granado 
et al (2005) 
   
 
 
▪ Aslam and Yilmaz (2011) 
▪ Freinkman and 
Plekhanov (2009) 
 
▪ Inchauste (2009) 
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Table 2: Quality Distinctions and the Weight of the Evidence 
Scale Criteria Preference Matching Technical Efficiency 
      Generally Positive 
Findings 
  Generally Insignificant 
or Negative Findings 
Generally Positive 
Findings 
Generally Insignificant or 
Negative Findings 
▪ Studies using panel data with random 
effects or between effects models may fall in 
this category 
▪ Papers using difference in differences but 
without providing support of parallel trends, 
papers using IV not considered particularly 
strong and papers using fixed effects but 
with very limited covariates may fall in this 
category 
SB
M
 
 
 
   
 
 
▪ Paes de Barros and 
Mendonca (1998) 
▪ King and Ozler (2000) 
▪ Khattri et al (2010) 
▪ Parker (2005) 
▪ Di Gropello and 
Marshall (2005) 
 
▪ Gunnarsson et al (2009) 
▪ Jimenez and Sawada (1999) 
▪ Sawada and Ragataz (2005) 
RANK 4: 
Less Credible 
Identification 
Strategy 
▪ Research that bases findings on self-
selected populations 
▪ Work that is likely to suffer from serious 
endogeneity challenges   
▪ Studies based on cross-sectional data that 
do not use any other sophisticated 
methodology to address endogeneity fall in 
H
ea
lt
h
  
 
   
▪ Hasnain (2008) 
▪ Schwartz et al (2002) 
 
 
 
▪ Treisman (2002) 
Ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
 
 
   
▪ Hasnain (2008) 
▪ Freinkman and 
Plekhanov (2009) 
 
▪ Di Gropello (2002) 
▪ Jimenez and Paqueo 
(1996) 
 
▪ Lockheed and Zhao (1993) 
▪ Treisman (2002) 
40 of 30 
 
Table 2: Quality Distinctions and the Weight of the Evidence 
Scale Criteria Preference Matching Technical Efficiency 
      Generally Positive 
Findings 
  Generally Insignificant 
or Negative Findings 
Generally Positive 
Findings 
Generally Insignificant or 
Negative Findings 
this category  
SB
M
 
 
 
   
 
 
▪ Eskeland and Filmer 
(2007) 
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Approximately around page 11 
Table 3: Selected Empirical Evidence of Preference Matching 
No. Author (Date) Country of 
Study 
Date 
Implemented 
Programme 
Description 
Method of 
Analysis 
Sample Measure/s of 
Decentralization 
Other Key Details Results 
RANK 2: Strongly Credible Identification Strategy 
1 Faguet (2004); 
Faguet and 
Sanchez (2008) 
Faguet (2012) 
Bolivia 1994 Increase in devolved funds to 
LG, responsibility for public 
services, establishment of 
oversight committees 
OLS using a fixed 
effects model 
Universe of 311 
regions over 1987 - 
1996 
▪ Binary measure of before 
and after D 
implementation  
Responsiveness claim 
based on greater 
investment in regions 
with high illiteracy 
▪ Investment in education increases 
significantly post D 
▪ Investment increases are associated 
with illiteracy levels  
▪ Investment in health did not change 
significantly post D 
 
2 Skoufias et al 
(2011) 
Indonesia 1999 Increase in devolved funds to 
LG, responsibility for public 
services. In 2005, direct 
election of local government 
Difference in 
differences 
 
Pre-
implementation 
parallel trends 
validation 
provided 
 
200 out of 400 
districts during 2001 
to 2006 
▪ Binary measure of 
election date 
Authors contend date 
local elections held 
exogenous based on 
illness, death, no 
confidence votes or new 
district creation 
▪ Overall public expenditure 
increased post D 
▪ Increase in spending on education 
post D 
▪ No significant change in health 
spending post D 
▪ No evidence of responsiveness 
RANK 3: Somewhat Credible Identification Strategy 
3 Arze del Granado 
et al (2005) 
Cross-country Various Various Various including 
OLS using fixed 
and random, also 
QMLE models 
45 developed and 
developing 
countries - 
Unbalanced panel 
over 1973 - 2000 
▪ Share of LG expenditure 
in total government 
expenditure 
Key controls include per 
capita income, budget 
balance, and population. 
Country and time effects 
used in some models 
▪ Higher D associated with higher 
proportion of spending on health and 
education 
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Table 3: Selected Empirical Evidence of Preference Matching 
No. Author (Date) Country of 
Study 
Date 
Implemented 
Programme 
Description 
Method of 
Analysis 
Sample Measure/s of 
Decentralization 
Other Key Details Results 
4 Akin et al (2005) Uganda 1993 - 1994 Fiscal decentralization, with 
rule-based unconditional 
grants given to regions  
OLS using a fixed 
effects model 
30 out of 45 regions 
during 1995 - 1998 
▪ Years since unconditional 
grant given to LG 
▪ Proportion of LG 
expenditure financed by 
LG revenues 
Key control includes per 
capita income. Authors 
attempt to provide 
validation that groups 
undergoing D earlier 
versus later do not differ 
systematically 
▪ Share of allocation to health 
decreased in local budgets, esp. in 
preventive and primary health care 
areas 
▪ Some evidence of spillover, where 
neighbours of high health spending 
districts have lower health spending 
 
 
 
 
RANK 4: 
Less Credible Identification Strategy 
5 Schwartz et al 
(2002) 
Philippines 1991 Increase in devolved funds to 
LG, responsibility for public 
services 
Spending trend 
analysis 
1600 LG - period 
includes 4 yrs 
before and 6 yrs 
after 
▪ Binary measure of before 
and after D 
implementation  
- ▪ Greater % spend allocated to health 
post D 
▪ Higher spend on private health 
goods, explained by expenses arising 
from devolution of hospitals 
6 Hasnain (2008) Pakistan 2001 Limited financial devolution 
but implementation of rule-
based transfers, responsibility 
for public services, political 
devolution 
Allocation trend 
analysis 
33 out of 35 districts 
in Punjab over 
2006-2007 
▪ Budget allocations to 
sectors 
▪ Relative size of LG spend 
on sector 
- ▪ LG spend focused on infrastructure 
and away from education & health 
▪ Provinces driving education 
interventions, providing incentives to 
shift away budgets 
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Table 3: Selected Empirical Evidence of Preference Matching 
No. Author (Date) Country of 
Study 
Date 
Implemented 
Programme 
Description 
Method of 
Analysis 
Sample Measure/s of 
Decentralization 
Other Key Details Results 
7 Freinkman and 
Plekhanov (2009) 
Russia Phased beginning in 
1994 
Increased fiscal powers with 
rule-based transfers, 
responsibility for public 
services 
OLS using a 
between effects 
model 
73 out of 83 regions, 
with data collection 
in 2003 
▪ Share of LG education 
expenditure financed by 
own revenue 
▪ Type of decentralization 
arrangement 
- ▪ No significant impact on inputs 
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Approximately around page 15 
Table 4: Selected Empirical Evidence of Technical Efficiency - Health 
No. Author (Date) Country of 
Study 
Date 
Implemented 
Programme 
Description 
Method of 
Analysis 
Sample Measure/s of 
Decentralization 
Other Key Details Results 
RANK 2: Strongly Credible Identification Strategy 
1 Uchimura and 
Jutting (2009) 
China 1970s Devolved expenditure but 
growingly centralized 
revenue authority, 
responsibility for delivery of 
health services, no political 
devolution 
OLS using a fixed 
effects model 
26 provinces over 
period 1995 - 2001 
▪ LG expenditure / LG own 
revenue 
▪ LG expenditure / provincial 
expenditure 
Key controls include 
illiteracy rates, fertility 
rates and per capita 
income 
▪ Higher LG expenditure is 
associated with lower IMR 
RANK 3: Somewhat Credible Identification Strategy 
2 Asfaw et al (2007) India 1980s Rule-based fiscal transfers to 
LG, responsibility for public 
services, political devolution 
OLS using 
between, fixed 
and random 
effects models 
14 States over period 
1990 - 1997 
▪ Index determined by 
factor analysis - share of LG 
expenditure in state, total 
LG expenditure per person, 
share of LG own revenue in 
LG expenditure 
Key controls include per 
capita income of state, 
share of literate women 
and index of political 
decentralization. No 
controls for fertility 
▪ D significantly associated with 
lower IMR in fixed and random 
effects model but not in the 
between effects model 
3 Habibi et al (2003) Argentina 1991 Decentralized financing, staff 
management and budgeting 
to LG.  
OLS using a fixed 
effects model, 
GLS 
23 of 23 provinces over 
1970 to 1994 
▪ Share of resources in 
provincial control to total 
resources 
▪ Share of locally generated 
resources to locally 
controlled resources 
Key controls include per 
capita income, per 
capita expenditure and 
number of public sector 
employees 
▪ Share of locally generated to 
locally controlled resources is 
associated with lower infant 
mortality rates 
4 Inchauste (2009) Bolivia 1994 Increase in transfers to LGs 
following HIPC initiative - 
2000 onwards 
OLS using a 
random effects 
model 
300 municipalities over 
period 1999 - 2002 
▪ Change in spending in 
health 
Entire sample is in post-
decentralization period  
▪ Decrease in share of unattended 
illness during period 
▪ No significant change in cases of 
respiratory diseases 
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Table 4: Selected Empirical Evidence of Technical Efficiency - Health 
No. Author (Date) Country of 
Study 
Date 
Implemented 
Programme 
Description 
Method of 
Analysis 
Sample Measure/s of 
Decentralization 
Other Key Details Results 
5 Robalino et al 
(2001) 
Cross-country Various Various OLS using a fixed 
effects model 
Low and High Income 
countries over period 
1970 - 1995 
▪ Expenditures managed by 
LG / managed by CG 
Key controls include 
GDP per capita, 
institutional variables 
such as corruption and 
political rights. No 
controls for fertility 
▪ 10% increase in share of locally 
managed expenditures is 
associated with 3.6% reduction in 
IMR for USD2k per capita country 
▪ Benefits U shaped - higher for 
high and low income countries 
and low for middle income 
6 Khaleghian (2004) Cross-country Various Various OLS using 
between effects 
model with time 
fixed effects 
140 Low and Middle 
Income countries over 
period 1980 - 1997 
▪ Presence of taxing, 
spending or regulatory 
authority by LGs 
Key controls include 
GDP per capita, 
population density, 
illiteracy, ethnic 
fractionalization and 
income inequality 
▪ D associated with higher 
coverage in lower income 
countries, and lower coverage in 
higher income countries - L shape 
suggested 
RANK 4: 
Less Credible Identification Strategy 
7 Treisman (2002) Cross-country Various Various OLS Up to 166 countries 
with cross-sectional 
data collected from 
mid-90s 
▪ Presence of LG exclusive 
authority on any one item 
▪ Some other measures of 
fiscal and political 
decentralization also used 
Extensive 
socioeconomic controls 
included 
▪ No significant association of sub-
national autonomy with either 
indicator 
▪ Electoral accountability 
associated with greater access to 
medication 
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Approximately around page 18 
Table 5: Selected Empirical Evidence of Technical Efficiency - Education 
No. Author (Date) Country of 
Study 
Date 
Implemented 
Programme 
Description 
Method of 
Analysis 
Sample Measure/s of 
Decentralization 
Other Key Details Results 
RANK 2: Strongly Credible Identification Strategy 
1 Faguet and Sanchez 
(2008) 
Colombia Phased beginning in 
1970s - key reform in 
1991 
Increase in devolved funds to 
LG, greater responsibility for 
public services, political 
devolution 
OLS and 2SLS 90% of municipalities 
universe over period 
1994 to 2004 
▪ LG own revenue sources / 
LG expenditure 
▪ Binary factor of Municipal 
Certification 
▪ Share of transfers to 
education expenditure 
- ▪ D positively associated with 
higher enrolment in public 
school 
2 Galiani et al (2008) Argentina 1991 Decentralized financing, staff 
management and budgeting 
to LG. Schools choose 
textbooks and teaching 
methods. 
Difference in 
differences  
 
Matching with 
difference in 
differences 
Almost all secondary 
schools over period 
1994 to 1999 
▪ Actual transfer from 
province to LG 
No validation of pre-
implementation parallel 
trends 
▪ D associated with higher 
Math and Spanish scores 
RANK 3: Somewhat Credible Identification Strategy 
3 Aslam and Yilmaz 
(2011) 
Pakistan 2001 Limited financial devolution 
but implementation of rule-
based transfers, 
responsibility for public 
services, political devolution 
OLS using a fixed 
effects model 
183 villages from 5 
districts out of 120+. 
Retrospective data 
collected for 1995 to 
2007 
▪ Binary measure of before 
and after D implementation  
Only control included is 
estimate of village 
population 
▪ Magnitude of education 
services increases after 
introduction of D 
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Method of 
Analysis 
Sample Measure/s of 
Decentralization 
Other Key Details Results 
4 Freinkman and 
Plekhanov (2009) 
Russia Phased beginning in 
1994 
Increased fiscal powers with 
rule-based transfers, 
responsibility for public 
services 
OLS using a 
between effects 
model 
Secondary school 
results from 73 out of 
83 regions, tested in 
2004 and 2005 
▪ Share of LG education 
expenditure financed by 
own revenue 
▪ Type of decentralization 
arrangement 
Key controls include 
socioeconomic controls as 
well as control for initial 
stock of education inputs 
▪ D associated with higher 
test scores 
5 Habibi et al (2003) Argentina 1991 Decentralized financing, staff 
management and budgeting 
to LG.  
OLS using a fixed 
effects model, GLS 
23 of 23 provinces over 
1970 to 1994 
▪ Share of resources in 
provincial control to total 
resources 
▪ Share of locally generated 
resources to locally 
controlled resources 
Key controls include per 
capita income, per capita 
expenditure and number 
of public sector 
employees 
▪ Share of locally generated 
to locally controlled 
resources is associated with 
higher enrolment  
6 Inchauste (2009) Bolivia 1994 Increase in transfers to LGs 
following HIPC initiative - 
2000 onwards 
OLS using a random 
effects model 
300 municipalities over 
period 1999 - 2005 
▪ Change in transfers for 
education 
▪ Change in spending in 
education 
- ▪ Increase in share of 
unenrolled children 
associated with increase in 
transfers 
▪ No significant impact of 
change in spending 
RANK 4: Less Credible Identification Strategy 
7 Di Gropello (2002) Chile Early 1980s Some increase in devolved 
funds to LG, greater 
responsibility for public 
services. In 1990s, greater 
pedagogical devolution to 
schools 
OLS 50 municipalities (out of 
355) - Student tests 
conducted in 1996 
▪ LG own funds / Total funds 
spent on education 
▪ School level parameters 
on participation, autonomy 
- ▪ Municipal financial 
autonomy not significant 
▪ Municipal training spend 
and wage incentives 
positively associated with 
test scores 
▪ School involvement in 
financial decision-making 
48 of 30 
 
Table 5: Selected Empirical Evidence of Technical Efficiency - Education 
No. Author (Date) Country of 
Study 
Date 
Implemented 
Programme 
Description 
Method of 
Analysis 
Sample Measure/s of 
Decentralization 
Other Key Details Results 
positively associated with 
test scores 
▪ School pedagogical and 
curricular autonomy 
positively associated with 
test scores 
8 Jimenez and 
Paqueo (1996) 
Philippines 1987 School councils raise funds, 
while LGs earmark taxes for 
supplemental school 
compensation 
OLS 600 elementary schools 
over period 1982 to 
1983 
▪ Proportion of school 
revenues from local sources 
- ▪ Locally financed schools 
have lower financial 
expenditure, indicating cost 
efficiency 
9 Lockheed and Zhao 
(1993) 
Philippines 1987 School councils raise funds, 
while LGs earmark taxes for 
supplemental school 
compensation 
OLS comparison of 
private, national 
and local 
government 
schools/ HLM 
8k 9th grade students in 
214 schools 
▪ Local government school 
status 
- ▪ No significant impact 
10 Treisman (2002) Cross-country Various Various OLS Up to 166 countries 
with cross-sectional 
data collected from 
mid-90s 
▪ Presence of LG exclusive 
authority on any one item 
▪ Some other measures of 
fiscal and political 
decentralization also used 
Extensive socioeconomic 
controls included 
▪ Negative and significant 
relationships between 
measures of decentralization 
and illiteracy 
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Table 6: Selected Empirical Evidence of Technical Efficiency – School-based Management 
No. Author (Date) Country of Study Date 
Implemented 
Programme 
Description 
Method of 
Analysis 
Sample Measure/s of 
Decentralization 
Other Key 
Details 
Results 
RANK 1: Very Strongly Credible Identification Strategy 
1 Duflo et al (2007)  Kenya 2005 Randomized trial which gave 
school councils money and 
autonomy to hire extra 
teachers and monitor their 
performance 
OLS comparison of 
treatment and control 
groups. Alternate 
specification uses 
covariates 
21k students from 210 
schools 
▪ Dummy variable 
indicating treatment 
group 
- SBM associated with 
▪ Increase in Mathematics scores 
of 0.24 standard deviations 
▪ Increase in Language scores of 
0.18 standard deviations 
2 Glewwe and Maiga 
(2011) 
Madagascar 2005 Randomized trial in which 
materials, training and 
greater accountability is 
given to three levels of 
districts, sub-districts and 
schools 
OLS comparison of 
treatment and control 
groups.  
20k students from 30 
districts over period 
2006 to 2007 
▪ Dummy variable 
indicating treatment 
group 
- ▪ No significant association with 
test scores 
RANK 2: Strongly Credible Identification Strategy 
3 Gertler et al (2011) Mexico 1996 Small grants to parent 
councils and parental 
training targeted at 
disadvantaged areas - AGE 
Difference in 
differences  
 
Pre-implementation 
parallel trends 
validation provided 
 
30,000 students from 
6,000 schools over 1997 
- 2001 
▪ Dummy variable 
indicating whether 
school received AGE 
intervention 
- SBM associated with 
▪ Reduction in failure rates by 4% 
▪ Reduction in repetition rates by 
5.4% 
▪ No impact on drop-out rates 
4 Skoufias and 
Shapiro (2006) 
Mexico 2001 Annual grants of up to USD 
15k given to schools/SMCs to 
improve education quality  
OLS and Difference-
in-differences with 
matching 
75000 schools over 
period 2001 - 2004 
▪ School received PEC 
grant in all three years 
▪ School received PEC 
grant in any one year 
No parallel trends 
validation provided 
 
SBM associated with 
▪ 0.24 lower dropout rates 
▪ 0.24 lower failure rates 
▪ 0.31 lower repetition rates 
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RANK 3: Somewhat Credible Identification Strategy 
5 Hanushek et al 
(2011) 
Cross-country Various Various OLS with country and 
time fixed effects 
1mn students from 42 
countries - 4 waves of 
PISA from 2000 to 2009 
▪ Autonomy over 
curriculum and 
pedagogy 
▪ Autonomy over 
personnel 
management 
▪ Autonomy over 
budgeting decision 
- ▪ Overall negative association 
between autonomy and scores 
6 Jimenez and 
Sawada (1999) 
El Salvador 1991 Community schools where 
SMCs can hire/ fire teachers, 
manage school funds and 
maintain infrastructure 
OLS with Heckman 
correction model 
605 3rd grade students 
from 162 municipalities 
- data from 1996 
▪ Binary indicating 
whether it is an EDUCO 
school or not 
- ▪ No association with Math or 
English test scores 
▪ Students in EDUCO schools have 
lower absenteeism 
7 Khattri et al (2010) Philippines 2003 Training and direct funding 
for school improvement 
Difference in 
differences with 
matching 
5k schools from 23 
districts over 2003 to 
2005 
▪ Dummy variable 
indicating whether 
school received 
intervention in first 
year 
Pre-implementation 
trends show 
differences between 
treatment and 
comparison group  
 
SBM associated with 
▪ 1.45 percentage points overall 
improvement 
▪ 1.82 percentage points 
improvement in Science 
▪ 1.32 percentage points 
improvement in English 
▪ 1.88 percentage points 
improvement in Mathematics 
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8 King and Ozler 
(2000) 
Nicaragua 1991 Autonomous schools with 
SMCs that can hire/ fire 
teachers, manage school 
funds and maintain 
infrastructure 
Matching + validation 
using fixed effects and 
IV 
3000 students from 
primary and secondary 
schools over period 
1995 - 1997 
▪ De jure autonomy - 
binary variable of 
whether the school is 
autonomous by law or 
not 
▪ De facto autonomy - 
actual school 
autonomy in various 
areas  
- ▪ No impact of de jure Autonomy 
▪ Positive association of de facto 
Autonomy with Math and Spanish, 
no association with Language 
9 Paes de Barros and 
Mendonca (1998) 
Brazil 1982 SBM with three key 
innovations:  
▪ Financial autonomy of 
schools 
▪ Ability to elect principals 
▪ Presence of school councils 
Difference in 
differences - state-
level 
18 states over period 
1981 - 1993 
▪ Financial autonomy 
of schools 
▪ Ability to elect 
principals 
▪ Presence of school 
councils 
No parallel trends 
validation provided 
 
▪ Lower repetition rates associated 
with financial autonomy 
▪ Lower mean grade level lag 
associated with financial autonomy 
and school councils 
▪ Lower proportion of students 
with lag associated with school 
council presence.  
▪ Proportion of students with lag 
negatively associated with 
principal election 
10 Parker (2005) Nicaragua 1991 Autonomous schools with 
SMCs that can hire/ fire 
teachers, manage school 
funds and maintain 
infrastructure 
Matching  1000 3rd and 6th grade 
students - tested in 
2002 
School autonomy in 
various areas 
- SBM associated with 
▪ Higher third grade Math scores 
▪ Lower sixth grade Math scores 
▪ No association with Spanish 
scores 
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11 Sawada and Ragatz 
(2005) 
El Salvador 1991 Community schools where 
SMCs can hire/ fire teachers, 
manage school funds and 
maintain infrastructure 
Matching 605 3rd grade students 
from 162 municipalities 
- data from 1996 
▪ Binary indicating 
whether it is an EDUCO 
school or not 
- ▪ No association with scores 
▪ Lower teacher absenteeism in 
EDUCO schools 
12 Gunnarsson et al 
(2009) 
Cross-country Various Various OLS and 2SLS 17k students from 10 
Latam countries - 1997 
survey data 
▪ Autonomy of school 
in decisions regarding 
hiring, budget 
allocation, curriculum 
design, etc. 
▪ Participation of 
parents and 
communities in school 
Instruments used 
include principal 
attributes and legal 
structures which 
could plausibly have 
independent impact 
on attainment 
▪ Autonomy associated with lower 
test scores 
▪ Participation associated with 
higher test scores 
13 Di Gropello and 
Marshall (2005) 
Honduras 1999 Community schools where 
SMCs can hire/ fire teachers, 
manage school funds and 
maintain infrastructure 
OLS with Heckman 
correction model 
200 rural schools tested 
in 2002 and 2003 
▪ Probit model 
predicting participation 
in PROHECO school 
Inconsistent data 
collection challenges 
SBM associated with  
▪ Higher science scores but with no 
change in Math or Language test 
scores 
▪ Marginally lower dropout rates 
RANK 4: Less Credible Identification Strategy 
14 Eskeland and Filmer 
(2007) 
Argentina 1978 Decentralized financing, staff 
management and budgeting 
to LG. Schools choose 
textbooks and teaching 
methods. 
OLS with province 
fixed effects 
24000 6th and 7th 
grade students from 
urban schools 
▪ Autonomy of school 
in various decisions 
▪ Participation of 
parents 
- SBM associated with 
▪ Higher Math but no change in 
Language scores 
▪ Effect is stronger for poorer 
households 
 
 
